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Abstract
It has been suggested that the human ability to process number and time both rely on common magni-
tude mechanisms, yet for time this commonality has mainly been investigated in the sub-second rather
than longer time ranges. Here we examined whether number processing is associated with timing in time
ranges greater than a second. Specifically,we tested longduration estimation abilities in adultswith a devel-
opmental impairment in numerical processing (dyscalculia), reasoning that any such timing impairment
co-occurring with dyscalculia may be consistent with joint mechanisms for time estimation and num-
ber processing. Dyscalculics and age-matched controls were tested on supra-second temporal estimation
(12 s), a difficulty-matched non-temporal control task, as well as mathematical abilities. Consistent with
our hypothesis, dyscalculics were significantly impaired in supra-second duration estimation but not in
the control task. Furthermore, supra-second timing ability positively correlated with mathematical profi-
ciency. All participants reported that they used counting to estimate time, although no specific instructions
were givenwith respect to counting. These results suggest that numerical processing and supra-second tem-
poral estimation share common mechanisms. However, since this conclusion is also based on subjective
observations, further work needs to be done to determine whether mathematical impairment co-occurs
with supra-second time estimation impairment when counting is not involved in and is objectively con-
trolled for during supra-second timing. We hypothesize that counting, that does not develop normally in
dyscalculics, might underlie and adversely affect dyscalculics’ supra-second time estimation performance,
rather than an impairment of a magnitude mechanism or the internal clock pacemaker.
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1. Introduction
Although it has been proposed that temporal and numerical processing rely on
shared mechanisms (e.g., Cantlon et al., 2009; Cappelletti et al., 2011b; Dehaene &
Brannon, 2010;Meck&Church, 1983;Meck et al., 1985;Walsh, 2003; but seeAgrillo
et al., 2010), most studies investigating these processes focused on very brief tem-
poral durations, usually in the sub-second range (e.g., for reviews see Hayashi et
al., 2013a; Walsh, 2003), while investigations in the supra-second time range are
very limited (Cappelletti et al., 2009, 2011b; Hayashi et al., 2013b). These studies
found that numerical information affects supra-second timing performance. For
example, Cappelletti and colleagues found that a numerically-impaired patient
performed normally on supra-second time estimations of 15–60 s intervals with
neutral stimuli, but was impaired if the (task-irrelevant) stimuli were numbers.
While sub-second timing is considered more automatic, relying on sensory-
motor mechanisms, supra-second timing, also termed ‘cognitive timing’, involves
higher-level perceptual and neural mechanisms (Allman et al., 2014; Gilaie-Dotan
et al., 2011; Lewis & Miall, 2003; Mauk & Buonomano, 2004; Meck, 1996; Poppel,
1997). In the context of timing andnumber processing, supra-second timing—but
crucially not sub-second timing — often relies on strategies involving numerical
processes. For example, counting is a frequently used strategy to estimate supra-
second durations (Gilliland &Martin, 1940; sometimes referred to as ‘chronomet-
ric counting’, see Hinton & Rao, 2004; Rakitin et al., 1998; Wearden & McShane,
1988), and other numerical operations such as adding and subtracting are also
used, especially for supra-second intervals in the order of minutes or hours. Inter-
estingly, even though counting is a simple numerical skill typically acquired during
childhood, people with developmental impairment in numerical processing (de-
velopmental dyscalculia — DD) often have difficulty with counting and acquire
this skill at later developmental stages (Butterworth, 2003, 2010; Kaufmann, 2008;
Rubinsten & Henik, 2009).
Here we focused on the link between numerical processing and supra-second
temporal processing and took a new perspective by examining whether a devel-
opmental impairment in numerical processing may extend to time estimation in
the supra-second range. Adults diagnosed with developmental dyscalculia, plus
numerically-normal participants performed temporal estimation tasks of supra-
second (∼12 s) durations, using an established experimental paradigm (Brown et
al., 1995; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2011). This procedure of supra-second temporal es-
timation (Brown et al., 1995; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2011) is different from the peak
interval (PI) timing paradigm used in humans (Hinton & Rao, 2004; Rakitin et al.,
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1998) that assesses supra-second temporal reproduction of pre-learned intervals of
unknown durations with on-going detailed feedback, and does not allow chrono-
metric counting. In our paradigmwe purposely did not instruct participants to use
or refrain from using counting, both because we wanted them to perform timing
estimation most naturally, and also because we did not want to bias task instruc-
tions towards the numerical domain, which is impaired in DDs. To assess whether
any possible impairment was specific to time estimation or simply related to sus-
tained attention, participants also performed a non-temporal control task with
identical stimuli and matched in difficulty and attentional demands. We also in-
dependently assessed participants’ temporal discrimination thresholds for twelve-
seconddurations in order to obtain amore sensitivemeasure of their supra-second
time estimation ability. Finally, we examined whether mathematical abilities and
supra-second timing estimation were associated. We hypothesised that DDs may
be impaired in supra-second timing estimation (but not in the control task) due to
their difficulty with numerical processing.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
All participants were neurologically normal, right-handed adults with normal or corrected to normal vision and
who gave written informed consent to participate in the study. The study was approved by the local ethics com-
mittee.
2.1.1. Adults with Developmental Dyscalculia
Six participants (six females, mean age 42.7, range 28–72) previously diagnosed with dyscalculia took part in the
study. The Dyscalculia Screener (Butterworth, 2003) and additional mathematical tasks were used to diagnose
dyscalculia; general intelligence was also assessed.
2.1.2. Control Participants
Nineteen numerically-normal participants who were age-matched to the DDs (11 females, mean age 34.8, range
19–70) participated in all the experiments. Eleven of these participants also completed the IQ and mathematical
assessment as detailed in Tables 1 and 2.
2.2. Dyscalculia Diagnosis
The diagnosis of dyscalculia was based on the Dyscalculia Screener and corroborated by additional standardized
tests. The Dyscalculia Screener is a standardized software that comprises four computer-controlled, item-timed
tasks, divided into two subscales: a ‘capacity’ and an ‘achievement’ subscale involving two tasks each (a dot–
number matching and a number comparison task for the first subscale, and two math verification tasks for the
second subscale; see Butterworth, 2003, 2005). The software diagnoses dyscalculia on the basis of norms that look
at performance expressed as an inverse efficiency score (median reaction times over accuracy; see Butterworth,
2003, 2005; Landerl et al., 2004).
Moreover, the following numerical andmathematical tasks were used to corroborate the diagnosis of DD, and
specifically: (1) the arithmetic subtest of theWechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R; Wechsler, 1986), consist-
ing of a series of 20 arithmetical problems embedded in a text and orally presented for an oral answer. Correct
answers produced within a maximum time (spanning from 15 to 60 s depending on the problem) were assigned
one point; (2) the GradedDifficulty Arithmetic test (GDA; Jackson&Warrington, 1986), a standardised task based
on 12 two- to three-digit addition and 12 two- to three-digit subtraction problems of progressive difficulty (e.g.,
from ‘13 + 15’ to ‘243 + 149’), orally presented one at a time for an oral answer which scored one point if correctly
produced within 10 s; (3) number comparison task, a key test to assess number processing requiring participants
to indicate as fast as possible the larger of two Arabic numbers presented to the left and right of a central fixation
172 S. Gilaie-Dotan et al. / Timing & Time Perception 2 (2014) 169–187
Table 1.
DD’s performance in IQ subtasks. Percentile and standard deviation (SD) in brackets. Impaired per-
formance (more than two SDs below the mean) is shown in bold
Tasks performed All DD (N = 6) Individual DD
1 2 3 4 5 6
IQa 103.5 (5.9) 98 106 103 106 113 94
Verbal scalea 98.83 91 95 106 98 112 91
Vocabularyb 70.50 25 95 63 95 95 50
Similaritiesb 63.33 37 84 75 75 84 25
Arithmeticb 19.83 9 25 1 25 9 50
Digit spanb 58.00 37 50 37 99 50 75
Performance scalea 105.17 106 108 99 109 113 96
Block designb 69.83 63 84 50 75 63 84
Matricesb 74.83 63 75 75 91 95 50
a WAIS-3 (Wechsler, 1986). Verbal, Performance, and Full Scale IQ scores are normative (mean of
100, SD of 15). Full Scale IQ calculated disregarding performance in the arithmetical sub-task.
b Percentile.
point. Thirty-six pairs of single-digit Arabic numbers (1 to 9)were individually presented. Stimulus pairs were cen-
tred along the horizontal line of the computer screen and displayed for 500 ms each to the left or the right of the
fixation crosswhichwas presented before each trial for 100ms; number stimuliwere replacedby a black screen for
a maximum of 4 s during which participants made an answer. After this, the following trial started immediately.
Using a design similar to previous studies (e.g., Cappelletti et al., 2013), the following numerical distances were
used: 1 (e.g., 7 vs. 8; eight trials), 2 (e.g., 3 vs. 1; eight trials), 3 (e.g., 5 vs. 2; eight trials), 4 (e.g., 1 vs. 5; eight trials),
5 (e.g., 4 vs. 9; four trials), with an equal number of trials where the smaller digit was on the left or on the right
within each numerical distance; and (4) a numerosity discrimination task, which allows obtaining an index of
accuracy sensitive to dyscalculia, theWeber fraction (wf ; Halberda et al., 2008; Mazzocco et al., 2011; Piazza et al.,
2010). For this task, the same experimental design, procedure and data analysis of a previous paradigm (Halberda
et al., 2008) were used.
General intelligence was assessed with the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1986).
To be classified as dyscalculic, participants had to demonstrate: (i) a score below 81 on at least one of the
two tasks of the capacity subscale of the Dyscalculia Screener (test average of the nationally standardized score=
100, SD= 15); (ii) impaired performance on the two standardized arithmetic tasks relative to norms; (iii) impaired
performance on the number comparison task in terms of either low accuracy or abnormally larger or inexistent
distance effect (see below) relative to controls; (iv) larger Weber Fraction in the numerosity discrimination tasks
relative to controls; and (v) an IQ score within the normal range (full-scale IQ not below 80).
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, all six DD participants showed a score below the cut-off point in the Dyscalculia
Screener; theywere also significantly impaired in the two standardized calculation tests relative to norms, and rel-
ative to the control group [Welch’s t -test,WAISproblem: t (7.81) = −8.55,p < 0.0001; GDA: t (14.99) = −8.21,
p < 10−5], and these results still hold even without any assumptions on sample distribution (Mann–Whitney–
Wilcoxon test:W = 21,p < 0.001 forWAIS problem and for GDA). In the number comparison task, DDs showed
an abnormally large distance effect such that the time required to discriminate between stimuli numerically close
was significantly longer relative to controls [DD vs. controls: Welch’s t -test: t (5.63) = 3.50, p = 0.0174; Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon test:W = 83,p < 0.002], consistent with some previous studies (e.g., Ashkenazi et al., 2009;
Holloway&Ansari, 2008;Mussolin et al., 2010). In thenumerositydiscrimination task,DDs showedanabnormally
largeWeber Fraction relative to numerically-normal participants [Welch’s t -test: t (5.87) = 3.67, p = 0.0145; or
without assumptions on the sample distribution Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon results: W = 85, p < 0.001], which
typically suggests impaired number processing (Mazzocco et al., 2011; Piazza et al., 2010). DD’s IQ was average or
high average, indicating preserved intellectual functioning.
Overall these results suggest that the participants’ profile was consistent with dyscalculia.
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2.3. Experiments and Tasks
All participants performed the experiments described below in one testing session. At the end of the session,
each participant was debriefed about the experiments: askedwhether they used any strategy to perform the tasks,
which task was more difficult for them, etc.
2.3.1. Task 1: Temporal Estimation of Supra-second Durations
To examine whether estimation of supra-second duration was preserved in dyscalculic participants, we con-
structed a temporal discrimination paradigm inspired byCoull and colleagues (Coull et al., 2004), whereby partic-
ipants had to discriminate between visually presented 12 s and 13.2 s duration intervals in a two alternative forced
choice manner. Crucially, the same paradigm also served as a non-temporal control experiment with a simple
change of task instructions [see below, Fig. 1, and Gilaie-Dotan et al. (2011) for more details].
In the temporal discrimination task, each trial presented one interval of either 12 s or 13.2 s duration. Par-
ticipants were instructed to estimate whether the interval duration was 12 s or 13.2 s without using any motor,
sensory or verbal aid (i.e., no tapping, speaking etc.). They were not instructed to use any specific method, and
were also not instructed to refrain fromor use counting, as we did notwant to bias the taskwith numerical-related
instructions. No feedback was provided for correct or for incorrect responses as we did not want to influence per-
formance via feedback and learning. Participants were given a few practice trials (see below) to familiarize with
the task. Each trial consisted of a small white empty circle (visual angle of 0.286°) appearing at fixation on a black
background for 12 s or 13.2 s. Along with the white empty circle, bigger coloured circles (diameter of 7.44° of vi-
sual angle) briefly appeared (each for 250 ms), giving the impression of a single flash/flicker with each coloured
circle presentation (see Fig. 1A). The colours of the circles were similar to the colour shades reported by Coull et
al. (2004) and were red (R, G, B) = (139, 0, 65), pink (139, 7, 108), purple (116, 0, 213), another shade of purple
(100, 19, 111), and blue (60, 20, 168). The colours’ order and the number of flickering coloured circles in each trial
varied across trials (between three and nine circles per trial, average of 6.25). The flickering circles appeared in
an asynchronous fashion within each trial (SOA between 400 to 7300ms, mean 1831 ms), and the onsets of circle
appearances varied across trials. Participants were instructed tomake unspeeded responses to estimate the dura-
tion of the white circle in each trial (while ignoring the bigger coloured circles) by pressing one of two predefined
keys for the 12 or 13.2 s responses. Stimuli were presented at 1024 × 768 resolution and a refresh rate of 60 Hz
via Cogent MATLAB toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_2000.php) and were viewed from a distance of
approximately 50 cm.
Before themain experimental session, participants performeda four-trial practice session to familiarize them-
selves with the temporal task. Participants then performed 36 trials of the task administered in three blocks (12
trials in each block), half of the trials in each block lasted 12 s, the other half 13.2 s. The order of 12 and 13.2 s trials
was counterbalanced within and across blocks. Participants’ responses to each block were classified as correct or
incorrect. Individual accuracy measures were averaged over all responses from the three blocks.
2.3.2. Task 2: Non-temporal Control
Herewe examinedwhether potential impairments in dyscalculics’ performance for supra-second time estimation
of durations (12 s) were time-specific or reflected other processes such as sustained attention. Similar to previous
studies on numerically-normal adults (Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2011; see also Coull et al., 2004), we used the same
supra-second time estimation paradigm but now changed the task instructions to require a discrimination of
colour rather than time. On each trial, participants had to attend to the colour of the flickering large circles and
judge whether the colour of the last appearing circle was same or different than the colour of its preceding circle.
Importantly, as mentioned above, each trial contained a different number of flashing coloured circles presented
at an asynchronous rate, so participants could not anticipate the last circle’s appearance, and therefore had to
remain attentive throughout the whole trial, similar to the time discrimination task.
Theorder of trials requiring ‘samecolour’ or ‘different colour’ responsewas counterbalancedwithin andacross
blocks, as well as counterbalanced between trials of 12 and 13.2 s, so that half of the ‘same colour’ trials lasted 12 s,
the other half 13.2 s, and the same for the ‘different colour’ trials.
2.3.3. Task 3: Temporal Sensitivity to Supra-second Durations
In this experiment we measured individual temporal sensitivity to intervals of the order of 12 s, i.e., the duration
difference at which a participant was able to discriminate 12 s from longer intervals. To yield this finer psychomet-
ricmeasure,we varied the duration length in each of the trials longer than 12 s (as described earlier inGilaie-Dotan
et al., 2011).We used a Bayesian adaptive procedure that efficiently estimated the individual duration difference at
which a participant performed at a desired level of 75% accuracy (QUEST;Watson& Pelli, 1983) in discriminating
between intervals of 12 s and longer intervals, using the mean of the posterior probability density function.
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Figure 1. Experimental paradigm and results of supra-second timing (Task 1) and non-temporal con-
trol (Task 2). (A) Timeline and stimuli from two experimental trials. The same paradigm was used
for the supra-second timing and the colour discrimination control tasks (Tasks 1 and 2 respectively,
see Methods). The temporal task (Task 1) required discriminating between 12 s and 13.2 s durations
while ignoring the coloured circles; the colour task (Task 2) required discriminating between the
colours of the last presented circle in a trial and the one preceding it (‘same’ or ‘different’). Expected
correct responses according to the task are indicated on the top right corner. Both colour and time
tasks required sustained attention throughout the trials since the number of flashing circles and their
appearances were unexpected (number of circles per trial varied across trials and stimulus appear-
ances were asynchronous, i.e., different SOA). A small white empty circle appeared at the beginning
of each trial until the end of the trial. Participants responded after the white small circle disap-
peared. (B) Accuracy in the supra-second temporal discrimination (left) and non-temporal colour
tasks (right) for dyscalculics (in darker shade) and numerically-normal controls (AM Controls, in
lighter shade). Dyscalculics were significantly impaired in supra-second duration estimation com-
pared to controls and compared to their performance in the colour task, but no significant differences
were found between dyscalculics and controls in the control non-temporal colour task, or between
the controls’ performance on the time and colour tasks. Asterisks indicate significant differences, N.S.
non-significant (see Results for further details). Error bars represent standard deviations (SD). This
figure is published in colour in the online version.
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Each trial consisted of centrally presented blue rectangle with purplish borders (14.14° × 6.61°, width ×
height), lasting exactly 12 s or a variable longer duration. The durations of the intervals longer than 12 s were
determined adaptively during the experiment by the QUEST algorithm according to the participant’s sensitivity
(example duration ranges: high supra-second temporal sensitivity participant with 12 952–13 125 ms; low sensi-
tivity participant with 13 199–20 112ms). There were six trials of 12 s interspersed randomly among fourteen trials
of longer duration. Participants were instructed to judge whether each trial lasted 12 s or longer. The temporal
perceptual threshold was defined as the estimated duration () that allowed each participant to discriminate
12 s and 12 +  s at the predetermined accuracy level, as described above.
3. Results
We first examined whether DDs were impaired in supra-second timing (Task 1),
and whether any such impairment was time-specific or instead due to non-
temporal factors (Task 2).
We performed a 2 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) on accuracy with group
(DDs vs. controls) and task (time estimation vs. colour) as factors. We found a sig-
nificant main effect of group [F(1,46) = 7.13, p < 0.02] and task [F(1,46) =
19.8, p < 0.0001], and a significant interaction between group and task
[F(1,46) = 6.86, p < 0.02]. Post-hoc between-group analysis revealed that DD
participants were significantly impaired relative to controls in supra-second (12 s)
temporal estimation [DDs: 63.9% ± 8.1%, controls: 78.5% ± 8.6%; Welch’s t -test:
t (8.9) = −3.81, p < 0.01, see Fig. 1B, left panel]. These results still hold even
without any assumptions on sample distribution [Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test:
W = 33,p < 0.005]. In contrast to the temporal task (Task 1), on the colour judge-
ment task (Task 2), DDs were as accurate as controls [DD: 83.4%± 5.9%, controls:
83.6 ± 8.9%, t (15.48) = −0.05, p > 0.95; or without assumptions on sample
distribution Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test: W = 69, p > 0.58, see Fig. 1B right
panel]. Furthermore, within-group comparisons revealed that DDs’ performance
was significantly reduced in the time task compared to the colour task [two-tailed
paired t -test, t (5) = 5.00, p < 0.005], while in the controls there was no signifi-
cant performance difference between the two tasks [t (18) = 1.7, p > 0.1].
The difference between the groups in temporal estimation was also significant
when we examined the temporal sensitivities of both groups obtained from Task 3
(see Fig. 2). Specifically, relative to controls DDs neededmore time to discriminate
successfully 12 s interval from a longer interval: DDs’ thresholds were 3.6 ± 0.21
corresponding to duration of 4342± 1991ms, while thresholds for controls were
3.3± 0.3, corresponding to a duration of 2551± 1652ms [Welch’s t -test for DDs
vs. controls on thresholds: t (11.84) = 2.52, p < 0.03; nonparametric tests also
confirm these results for the thresholds or for their converted duration : Mann–
Whitney–Wilcoxon test: W ’s = 111, p’s < 0.04].
These results suggest that DDs were impaired in estimating supra-second tem-
poral durations and that this impairment was not due to attentional factors, as the
DDs were not impaired in the non-temporal control task (Task 2) that had simi-
lar attentional demands as the temporal task (Task 1). This conclusion was further
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Figure 2. Supra-second perceptual thresholds (Task 3). This task measured the duration difference
in milliseconds (ms) needed to discriminate 12 s from longer intervals (see Methods, DDs in darker
shade, controls in lighter shade). Perceptual thresholds are presented on the left and converted to
their corresponding durations (ms) that are presented on the right. DDs needed significantly longer
durations than controls to discriminate correctly 12 s from longer intervals (due to data dependency,
only thresholds (left) were statistically compared). This figure is published in colour in the online
version.
supported by the absence of any correlation between performance on the time and
the colour tasks in both groups [DDs: R2 = 0.0001, p(non-directional) > 0.98,
t (4) = −0.024, age-matched controls: R2 = 0.008, p(non-directional) > 0.71,
t (17) = −0.37]. Next, we validated that our supra-second temporal discrimina-
tion measure was not too coarse by comparing the accuracy levels in the temporal
task (Task 1) to the finer temporal sensitivity thresholds measured in our second
time discrimination task (Task 3). These independent temporal measures were
highly correlated [correlations between time accuracy and measured threshold:
DDs: R2 = 0.56, p(non-directional) = 0.089, t (4) = −2.239, age-matched con-
trols: R2 = 0.27, p(non-directional) = 0.022, t (17) = −2.52, all: R2 = 0.42,
p(non-directional) = 0.0005, t (23) = −4.08, see Fig. 3 for the estimated thresh-
olds converted to ms]. Thus, accuracy levels in our temporal task (Task 1) reliably
predicted individual’s supra-second timing sensitivity threshold (Task 3).
We also examinedwhether DDs’ reduced accuracies for supra-second durations
(Task 1) might reflect perceptual shortening or lengthening of supra-second inter-
vals. Perceiving 12 s intervals as lasting 13.2 s corresponds to subjective slowing
down of the time (‘speeding up of the pacemaker’, see Treisman, 1963; Treisman et
al., 1990), or to overestimation of supra-second durations, while perceiving 13.2 s as
lasting 12 s corresponds to subjective speeding up of the subjective time (‘slowing
down of the pacemaker’), or underestimation of supra-second durations. Four of
the six DDs responded to most trials (individual percentages of 75, 62.5, 63.9, 75)
as lasting 13.2 s (overestimation) while the other two DDs responded to themajor-
ity of the trials (individual percentages of 88.9, 58.3) as lasting 12 s (underestima-
tion). Therefore our data did not support a consistent bias of subjective shortening
or lengthening of supra-second intervals in DDs, but rather reduced accuracy lev-
els.
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Figure 3. Supra-second temporal performance: accuracy vs. perceptual threshold. Temporal esti-
mation accuracy measured in Task 1 (x-axis), and temporal discrimination perceptual threshold
for supra-second durations (12 s) measured in Task 3 (the duration difference in milliseconds (ms)
needed to discriminate 12 s durations at a fixed accuracy level of 75%) for supra-second durations
by an adaptive method (y-axis). Each point in the scatter plot represents data from one participant
(DDs in darker shade, controls in lighter shade). The significant correlation found between these
two measurements indicates on the reliability of the main experimental task for assessing individ-
ual supra-second temporal discriminations ability. This figure is published in colour in the online
version.
Since we found that a developmental numerical impairment affects supra-
second time estimation, we directly examined whether numerical/arithmetical
abilities correlated with the ability to estimate long durations. We found that
supra-second temporal estimation significantly correlatedwithmathematical pro-
ficiency [supra-second timing accuracy vs. WAIS percentile: R2 = 0.46, t (15) =
3.59, p = 0.003 (Fig. 4A); vs. GDA percentile: R2 = 0.45, t (15) = 3.51, p =
0.003 (Fig. 4B); vs. Weber fraction: R2 = 0.23, t (15) = −2.11, p = 0.052
(Fig. 4C); vs. number comparison mean RTs: R2 = 0.17, t (15) = −1.75, p =
0.099, see Fig. 4D]. To examine whether these results are driven by a main ef-
fect of group, we explored whether they hold in each group separately. However,
given the low number of DDs for a correlation analysis, we assessed the correlation
between supra-second temporal estimation and mathematical proficiency in the
controls only (N = 11 that had themathematicalmeasurements). The correlation
in the controlswas not significant but indicated a possible tendency [supra-second
timing accuracy vs. WAIS percentile: R2 = 0.23, t (9) = 1.65, p = 0.13; vs. GDA
percentile: R2 = 0.18, t (9) = 1.42, p = 0.19 (Fig. 4B)]. Although we cannot rule
out that these results are driven by a main effect of group, they provide an ad-
ditional illustration of the DDs’ impairment in supra-second timing. We further
examined whether the correlation between supra-second temporal ability and
numerical skills was number–specific. To that end we examined whether supra-
second temporal estimation correlated with verbal IQ, but found that they were
not significantly correlated [R2 = 0.001, t (11) = −0.107, p = 0.91].
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Figure 4. Correlations between supra-second temporal discrimination and mathematical perfor-
mance. Performance for each participant is indicated by a point in each panel (dyscalculics in darker
shade, controls in lighter shade). For all plots timing accuracy (Task 1) is plotted on the x-axes
and mathematical performance on the y-axes: (A) WAIS, (B) GDA, (C) Weber fraction scores, and
(D) number comparison response times (see Methods for more details). Pearson R2 values are re-
ported on each plot, with dark asterisks indicating correlation significance at p < 0.05, and light
asterisks at p < 0.1. This figure is published in colour in the online version.
Finally we wanted to assess whether DD’s impairment in supra-second tem-
poral estimation might result from a difference in the strategies used to perform
the task. Since counting is a commonly used strategy to estimate supra-second
intervals (e.g., Brown et al., 1995; Gilliland &Martin, 1940), which might be defec-
tive in DDs (Butterworth, 2003, 2010; Kaufmann, 2008; Rubinsten&Henik, 2009),
we reasoned that they might rely on different strategies to estimate supra-second
durations. However, in the post-experimental debriefing all DDs as well as their
controls reported that they relied on counting to estimate the supra-second in-
tervals despite not being instructed to do so, and despite possible difficulties that
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DDsmight have with counting. Although this does not rule out the possibility that
counting in DDs was different than counting in the controls, it suggests that DD
and controls relied on a similar strategy to estimate supra-second durations.
4. Discussion
Our study examined the link between different dimensions of magnitude pro-
cessing, and specifically time and number processing. We investigated whether
a developmental impairment in numerical processing (developmental dyscalcu-
lia) generalized to another magnitude dimension, time perception. We reasoned
that if numerical impairment co-occurred with time perception impairment, then
someof themechanisms supporting number and timeprocessingmight be shared.
Anecdotally DD often report difficulties with daily life timings, for instance in cal-
culating how much time there is between appointments, in estimating what time
they need to leave home to be on time for an event, or sometimes not being able
to estimate the duration of events, for example how long a traffic light stays red,
how long a movie lasts, or even estimating how long it takes to travel to familiar
destinations. Our dyscalculic participants also reported recurrent time estimation
difficulties that emerge duringmundane activities. This of course could be a result
of numerical calculations often involved in temporal estimation, for instance cal-
culating how much time is left until a deadline involves subtracting current time
from the target time. In this study we focused on supra-second time ranges since
timing in this time range (and not sub-second timing) commonly involves numer-
ical processes such as counting (for time estimation), subtracting (to estimate an
event’s duration from start to end) and adding (how long consecutive events will
last), andwe used a temporal estimation task that did not require direct numerical
calculations. We found that dyscalculia co-occurred with significant impairment
in estimating supra-second temporal durations (∼12–13 s). This was not due to
sustained attention being impaired, as dyscalculics were not impaired in a non-
temporal control task with similar sustained attentional demands. Moreover, the
ability to estimate supra-seconddurations significantly correlatedwithproficiency
in mathematical tasks. Thus our results are suggestive of a shared mechanism in-
volved in both supra-second timing estimation and at least some numerical abili-
ties.
Why would supra-second time estimation and numerical ability rely on joint
mechanisms? One possibility might be that dyscalculics are globally impaired on
many tasks, which could explain their time estimation impairment. However, our
DDs showed average or high average IQ (see Table 1), and they were not impaired
in the non-temporal colour control task, ruling out such an explanation. A sec-
ond possibility is that impaired attention in DDmight affect both their numerical
ability and their supra-second time estimation. However, this possibility is also
unlikely given the results of the control task,whereDDs showedno sustainedatten-
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tion deficit in a non-temporal control task (see above). It may also be possible that
both supra-second time estimation and numerical ability rely on counting, which
some consider critical to the development of higher mathematical skills (for the
relationship between counting and higher mathematical skills see Butterworth,
1999, 2010). Even though counting is a basic and almost effortless skill, for indi-
viduals with numerical impairments as DDs, countingmay not be straightforward,
and even when it is fully developed in adulthood, its acquisition might not have
followed the normal developmental trajectory (Geary et al., 1992, 2000; Landerl et
al., 2004). Furthermore, even when fully developed, counting in DDsmay elicit an
abnormal emotional response such as stress (Rubinsten & Tannock, 2010). When
typical numerically developed individuals need to perform supra-second timing
estimation, they often rely on counting strategies (Brown et al., 1995; Gilaie-Dotan,
Kanai&Rees, unpublished observations; Gilliland&Martin, 1940) that allow them
to estimate slightly better supra-second intervals (Grondin et al., 1999, 2004; Rak-
itin et al., 1998; but seeHinton&Rao, 2004). Studies investigating the effectiveness
of counting found that counting is advantageous for estimating intervals longer
than 1.18 s but not for sub-second intervals (Grondin et al., 1999, 2004) and that
musicians with extensive musical training reproduce supra-second intervals more
accurately than non-musicians, whether relying on counting or singing (Grondin
& Killeen, 2009). Due to this common tendency to use counting for estimating
supra-second intervals, studies examining supra-second timingmechanisms often
use a dual task to interfere or prevent counting (see Hinton & Rao, 2004; Rakitin
et al., 1998), or specifically instruct participants not to count when timing (Hin-
ton & Rao, 2004; Rakitin et al., 1998; Treisman, 1984). Therefore, we suggest that
while counting does not adversely affect supra-second time estimation in typical
numerically-developed individuals, for DDs, due to their possible difficulties with
counting, their reliance on counting to perform supra-second timing estimation
may have adversely affected performance and lowered accuracy rates.
The timing performance wemeasured heremay rely on a counting strategy, giv-
ing the impression that timing and number sense are associated because of the
counting strategy. However, this is not necessarily the case as timingwith andwith-
out counting has yielded similar although not identical performances (Brown et
al., 1995; Gilliland & Martin, 1940), with counting reducing the variance in per-
formance (Grondin et al., 1999, 2004; Hinton et al., 2004). Future studies need to
determine whether DD’s would also be impaired in supra-second timing when not
relying on counting, as for example in the ‘peak interval’ paradigm, whereby one
learns through feedback to reproduce a supra-second interval (see Hinton & Rao,
2004; Rakitin et al., 1998, and below).
The internal clock model proposes that timing behaviour is based on the in-
teraction of an internal clock, memory storage of a reference duration, and com-
parison processes (e.g., Allman et al., 2014; Treisman, 1963; Treisman et al., 1990;
for review see Wearden, 2005). Briefly, depending on a sensory arousal centre,
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the pacemaker usually produces ticks/pulses at a constant basic characteristic
rate/frequency (Treisman et al., 1990, 1994) and sends them to a counter (i.e., the
accumulator). Comparing the values in the counter with the reference duration
stored in memory, determines the behavioural response. More sophisticated vari-
ations of this model accommodating for the complexity of biological systems have
been suggested by Treisman and colleagues (see Treisman et al., 1990, 1994). For
example, different arousal or emotional states, or sensory inputs may affect the
pacemaker function by perturbing its characteristic output frequency which in
turn might slow or speed up the internal clock function and cause over- or under-
estimation of time (see Treisman et al., 1990, 1994). We hypothesize that in DD the
pacemaker may commonly tick normally. However, when DDs performed time es-
timations that involve counting, which might have developed abnormally in DDs,
the counting process itself might have led to perturbations (delivered as sensory
inputs) in their pacemaker outputs, or to a noisier function of their internal clock
counter (i.e., the accumulator), thereby lowering their accuracy rates. Counting
may also lead to storing numerical values in the internal clock memory storage
rather than reference durations, thereby modifying the temporal magnitude com-
parisons (counter vs. memory) to numerical magnitude comparisons (Grondin et
al., 2004), which DDs might be impaired in. Therefore, we suggest that DDs might
perform normally on supra-second timing tasks that do not involve counting (e.g.,
judging which of two clip or two song excerpts is longer, and in paradigms as the
peak interval procedure (see above; Hinton & Rao, 2004; Rakitin et al., 1998). In
such tasks numerical processing might not interfere with the characteristic rhyth-
mic activity of the pacemaker. Support for the interference of numberswith timing
processes in DD comes from a recent study showing that DDs were not impaired
in sub-second duration tasks, but when task-irrelevant number stimuli were intro-
duced, DDs’ sub-second timing performance dropped significantly (Cappelletti et
al., 2011a). Thus, despite normal sub-sec timing in DD, even irrelevant numerical
involvement can disrupt it. So it remains possible that counting could create inter-
ference in supra-second time estimation, and that the degree of interference could
be related to numerical competence. Whether supra-second timing is impaired in
DDs when counting is not involved (see above) remains to be tested in future re-
search.
An alternative hypothesis to explain the supra-second time estimation impair-
ment in DDs that we observed may be that sub- and supra-second distinctions in
the time domain parallel small (up to 3–4) and bigger numerosity (bigger than 4)
processing in the numerical domain (Agrillo et al., 2012; Buhusi & Cordes, 2011;
Butterworth, 2010; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1993). This suggestion is based on the pro-
posal that smaller numbers rely on similarmechanisms as sub-sec timeperception,
while bigger numbers rely on joint mechanisms as supra-second time estimation
(Buhusi & Cordes, 2011). This idea is consistent with the proposition that dyscal-
culics would be more impaired when bigger numbers are involved (but see But-
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terworth, 2010), and also with the fact that DDs are not significantly impaired in
sub-sec timings (Cappelletti et al., 2011a). Furthermore, the transition between
sub-second (‘automatic’ or ‘sensory-motor’ timing, Bueti et al., 2012; Buhusi &
Meck, 2005; Buonomano, 2007; Lewis &Miall, 2003; Macar et al., 2006; Naatanen
et al., 2004;Wiener et al., 2010) and supra-second (‘cognitive’) timingmechanisms
occurs at around 3 s (Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2011; Poppel, 1997), which might paral-
lel the transition between mechanisms supporting small and larger numerosities
(Agrillo et al., 2012; Buhusi & Cordes, 2011; Cordes & Brannon, 2009), although
there is no consensus about this idea (see Buhusi & Cordes, 2011 for review).While
a distinction between ‘small’ and ‘large’ numerosities can be dichotomised, one
might also consider it on a magnitude continuum. Taking that view, DDs might be
impaired in accumulating continuous information, as evident in bigger numerosi-
ties or supra-second durations, and even in counting. We note however, that our
control task didnot involve a continuous accumulationprocess, so it is not possible
to fully test the accumulation hypothesis. Here we focused on supra-second dura-
tions of the order of 12 s that are well within the supra-second domain to ensure
that we were not tapping into short sub-second temporal mechanisms (Hayashi et
al., 2013a; Poppel, 1997), and are also in the big numerosities range (Agrillo et al.,
2012; Butterworth, 2010).
Finally, time and number sense (for review see Allman et al., 2011) might have
developed together, as supported by similar developmental trajectories (Brannon
et al., 2007; Cordes & Brannon, 2008; Roitman et al., 2007; but see Yates, 2012),
by behavioural evidence of magnitude/processing interference between temporal
and numerical dimensions (Javadi & Aichelburg, 2012; Tokita & Ishiguchi, 2011),
and by the anatomical proximity of the brain regions involved in time and number
processing. For example the parietal cortex is activated by both sub-second tem-
poral information and by numeric information (Castelli et al., 2006; Hayashi et al.,
2013a), and lesion studies in parietal cortex indicate its involvement in processing
both dimensions (Cappelletti et al., 2011b; see also Bueti &Walsh, 2009).
It has been proposed that magnitude dimensions such as space, time and num-
ber share common mechanisms (e.g., Aagten-Murphy et al., 2014; Bueti & Walsh,
2009; Cantlon et al., 2009; Lustig, 2011;Walsh, 2003; but see Agrillo et al., 2010; De-
haene&Brannon, 2010;Murphy, 1997; Yates et al., 2012), but it is not clear whether
this applies to bigger values/quantities within each magnitude dimension. The
parietal cortex has been suggested to be the underlying common magnitude pro-
cessing region (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2012; Walsh, 2003), especially for smaller
quantities, in activation studies (Castelli et al., 2006; Hayashi et al., 2013a), lesion
studies (Cappelletti et al., 2011b), and TMS (e.g., Hayashi et al., 2013a), but whether
such a ‘hub’ exists for bigger quantities is still unclear. Furthermore, while bigger
numerosities (bigger than 4, see above) might parallel supra-second time range, it
is not clear what would be the spatial parallel. In the time domain there are many
indications that time perception in different temporal scales (from milliseconds
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to years), are probably supported by distinct perceptual and neural mechanisms
(Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Cappelletti et al., 2009; Gilaie-Dotan et al., 2011; Lewis &
Miall, 2003; Merchant et al., 2013; Poppel, 1997). We suggest that timing mecha-
nisms for time ranges longer than supra-secondmay be supported bymechanisms
thatmay not be serving numerical or spatial processing. These could rely on rhyth-
mic bodily oscillatorymechanisms, circadian cycles, and evenmemory-relatednet-
works for longer-term timings, and will have to be tested in future studies.
In conclusion, we found a specific impairment in supra-second time estimation
in developmental dyscalculia that was not due to attentional factors, and that cor-
relatedwithmathematical ability.Wehypothesize that the abnormal development
of counting in developmental dyscalculia might underlie the supra-second timing
estimation impairment, rather than a general magnitudemechanism impairment.
Such atypical counting, when involved in timing operations, may adversely affect
the function of internal clock components.
Acknowledgements
This studywas funded byMarie-Curie fellowship (S.G.-D.), a Royal Society Dorothy
Hodgkin Fellowship, a Royal Society and a British Academy Grants (M.C.), and the
Wellcome Trust (G.R.). We thank all the participants for their participation in this
study.
References
Aagten-Murphy, D., Iversen, J. R.,Williams, C. L., &Meck,W.H. (2014). Novel inversions in auditory se-
quences provide evidence for spontaneous subtraction of time and number. TimingTimePercept.,
2, 188–209.
Agrillo, C., Piffer, L., Bisazza, A., & Butterworth, B. (2012). Evidence for two numerical systems that
are similar in humans and guppies. PLoS One, 7, e31923.
Agrillo, C., Ranpura, A., & Butterworth, B. (2010). Time and numerosity estimation are independent:
Behavioral evidence for twodifferent systemsusing a conflict paradigm.Cogn.Neurosci., 1, 96–101.
Allman,M. J., Pelphrey, K. A., &Meck,W.H. (2011). Developmental neuroscience of time and number:
Implications for autism and other neurodevelopmental disabilities. Front. Integr. Neurosci., 6, 7.
Allman, M. J., Teki, S., Griffiths, T. D., &Meck, W. H. (2014). Properties of the internal clock: First- and
second-order principles of subjective time. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 65, 743–771.
Ashkenazi, S., Rubinsten, O., & Henik, A. (2009). Attention, automaticity, and developmental dyscal-
culia. Neuropsychology, 23, 535–540.
Brannon, E.M., Suanda, S., & Libertus, K. (2007). Temporal discrimination increases in precision over
development and parallels the development of numerosity discrimination.Dev. Sci., 10, 770–777.
Brown, S. W., Newcomb, D. C., & Kahrl, K. G. (1995). Temporal-signal detection and individual differ-
ences in timing. Perception, 24, 525–538.
Bueti, D., Lasaponara, S., Cercignani, M., &Macaluso, E. (2012). Learning about time: Plastic changes
and interindividual brain differences. Neuron, 75, 725–737.
Bueti, D., & Walsh, V. (2009). The parietal cortex and the representation of time, space, number and
other magnitudes. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci., 364, 1831–1840.
S. Gilaie-Dotan et al. / Timing & Time Perception 2 (2014) 169–187 185
Buhusi, C. V., & Cordes, S. (2011). Time and number: The privileged status of small values in the brain.
Front. Integr. Neurosci., 5, 67.
Buhusi, C. V., & Meck, W. H. (2005). What makes us tick? Functional and neural mechanisms of in-
terval timing. Nat. Rev. Neurosci., 6, 755–765.
Buonomano, D. V. (2007). The biology of time across different scales. Nat. Chem. Biol., 3, 594–597.
Butterworth, B. (1999). A head for figures. Science, 284, 928–929.
Butterworth, B. (2003). Dyscalculia Screener. London, UK: NFER-Nelson.
Butterworth, B. (2005). Developmental dyscalculia. In J. I. D. Campbell (Ed.),Handbook ofMathemat-
ical Cognition (pp. 455–467). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Butterworth, B. (2010). Foundational numerical capacities and theorigins of dyscalculia.TrendsCogn.
Sci., 14, 534–541.
Cantlon, J. F., Platt, M. L., & Brannon, E. M. (2009). Beyond the number domain. Trends Cogn. Sci., 13,
83–91.
Cappelletti, M., Freeman, E. D., & Cipolotti, L. (2009). Dissociations and interactions between time,
numerosity and space processing. Neuropsychologia, 47, 2732–2748.
Cappelletti, M., Freeman, E. D., & Butterworth, B. L. (2011a). Time processing in dyscalculia. Front.
Psychol., 2, 364.
Cappelletti, M., Freeman, E. D., & Cipolotti, L. (2011b). Numbers and time doubly dissociate. Neu-
ropsychologia, 49, 3078–3092.
Cappelletti, M., Gessaroli, E., Hithersay, R., Mitolo, M., Didino, D., Kanai, R., Cohen Kadosh, R., &
Walsh, V. (2013). Transfer of cognitive training across magnitude dimensions achieved with con-
current brain stimulation of the parietal lobe. J. Neurosci., 33, 14899–14907.
Castelli, F., Glaser, D. E., & Butterworth, B. (2006). Discrete and analogue quantity processing in the
parietal lobe: A functional MRI study. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 103, 4693–4698.
Cohen Kadosh, R., Gertner, L., & Terhune, D. B. (2012). Exceptional abilities in the spatial represen-
tation of numbers and time: Insights from synesthesia. Neuroscientist, 18, 208–215.
Cordes, S., & Brannon, E. M. (2008). Quantitative competencies in infancy. Dev. Sci., 11, 803–808.
Cordes, S., & Brannon, E. M. (2009). Crossing the divide: Infants discriminate small from large nu-
merosities. Dev. Psychol., 45, 1583–1594.
Coull, J. T., Vidal, F., Nazarian, B., & Macar, F. (2004). Functional anatomy of the attentional modula-
tion of time estimation. Science, 303, 1506–1508.
Crawford, J. R., & Howell, D. C. (1998). Comparing an individual’s test score against norms derived
from small samples. J. Clin. Exp. Neuropsychol., 12, 482–486.
Dehaene, S., & Brannon, E. M. (2010). Space, time, and number: A Kantian research program Intro-
duction. Trends Cogn. Sci., 14, 517–519.
Geary, D. C., Bow-Thomas, C. C., & Yao, Y. (1992). Counting knowledge and skill in cognitive addition:
A comparison of normal andmathematically disabled children. J. Exp. Child Psychol., 54, 372–391.
Geary, D. C., Hamson, C. O., & Hoard, M. K. (2000). Numerical and arithmetical cognition: A lon-
gitudinal study of process and concept deficits in children with learning disability. J. Exp. Child
Psychol., 77, 236–263.
Gilaie-Dotan, S., Kanai, R., & Rees, G. (2011). Anatomy of human sensory cortices reflects inter-
individual variability in time estimation. Front. Integr. Neurosci., 5, 76.
Gilliland, A. R., & Martin, R. (1940). Some factors in estimating short time intervals. J. Exp. Psychol.,
27, 243–255.
Grondin, S., & Killeen, P. R. (2009). Tracking timewith song and count: DifferentWeber functions for
musicians and nonmusicians. Atten. Percept. Psychophys., 71, 1649–1654.
186 S. Gilaie-Dotan et al. / Timing & Time Perception 2 (2014) 169–187
Grondin, S., Meilleur-Wells, G., & Lachance, R. (1999). When to start explicit counting in a time-
intervals discrimination task: A critical point in the timing process of humans. J. Exp. Psychol.
Hum. Percept. Perform., 25, 993–1004.
Grondin, S., Ouellet, B., & Roussel, M. E. (2004). Benefits and limits of explicit counting for discrimi-
nating temporal intervals. Can. J. Exp. Psychol., 58, 1–12.
Halberda, J., Mazzocco, M. M., & Feigenson, L. (2008). Individual differences in non-verbal number
acuity correlate with maths achievement. Nature, 455, 665–668.
Hayashi, M. J., Kanai, R., Tanabe, H. C., Yoshida, Y., Carlson, S., Walsh, V., & Sadato, N. (2013a). Inter-
action of numerosity and time in prefrontal and parietal cortex. J. Neurosci., 33, 883–893.
Hayashi, M. J., Valli, A., & Carlson, S. (2013b). Numerical quantity affects time estimation in the
suprasecond range. Neurosci. Lett., 543, 7–11.
Hinton, S. C., Harrington, D. L., Binder, J. R., Durgerian, S., &Rao, S.M. (2004). Neural systems support-
ing timing and chronometric counting: An FMRI study. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res., 21, 183–192.
Hinton, S. C.,&Rao, S.M. (2004).One-thousandone. . . one-thousand two. . . ”: Chronometric counting
violates the scalar property in interval timing. Psychon. Bull. Rev., 11, 24–30.
Holloway, I. D., & Ansari, D. (2008). Domain-specific and domain-general changes in children’s de-
velopment of number comparison. Dev. Sci., 11, 644–649.
Jackson, M., & Warrington, E. K. (1986). Arithmetic skills in patients with unilateral cerebral lesions.
Cortex, 22, 611–620.
Javadi, A. H., & Aichelburg, C. (2012). When time and numerosity interfere: The longer themore, and
the more the longer. PLoS One, 7, e41496.
Kaufmann, L. (2008). Dyscalculia: Neuroscience and education. Educ. Res., 50, 163–175.
Landerl, K., Bevan, A., & Butterworth, B. (2004). Developmental dyscalculia and basic numerical ca-
pacities: A study of 8–9-year-old students. Cognition, 93, 99–125.
Lewis, P. A., & Miall, R. C. (2003). Distinct systems for automatic and cognitively controlled time
measurement: Evidence from neuroimaging. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol., 13, 250–255.
Lustig, C. (2011). The neuroscience of time and number: Untying the Gordian knot. Front. Integr. Neu-
rosci., 5, 47.
Macar, F., Coull, J., & Vidal, F. (2006). The supplementary motor area in motor and perceptual time
processing: fMRI studies. Cogn. Process., 7, 89–94.
Mauk, M. D., & Buonomano, D. V. (2004). The neural basis of temporal processing. Annu. Rev. Neu-
rosci., 27, 307–340.
Mazzocco, M. M., Feigenson, L., & Halberda, J. (2011). Impaired acuity of the approximate number
system underlies mathematical learning disability (dyscalculia). Child Dev., 82, 1224–1237.
Meck,W. H. (1996). Neuropharmacology of timing and time perception. Cogn. Brain Res., 3, 227–242.
Meck, W. H., & Church, R. M. (1983). A mode control model of counting and timing processes. J. Exp.
Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process., 9, 320–334.
Meck, W. H., Church, R. M., & Gibbon, J. (1985). Temporal integration in duration and number dis-
crimination. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process., 11, 591–597.
Merchant, H., Harrington, D. L., & Meck, W. H. (2013). Neural basis of the perception and estimation
of time. Annu. Rev. Neurosci., 36, 313–336.
Murphy,G. L. (1997). Reasons todoubt thepresent evidence formetaphoric representation.Cognition,
62, 99–108.
Mussolin, C., Mejias, S., & Noel, M. P. (2010). Symbolic and nonsymbolic number comparison in chil-
dren with and without dyscalculia. Cognition, 115, 10–25.
S. Gilaie-Dotan et al. / Timing & Time Perception 2 (2014) 169–187 187
Naatanen, R., Syssoeva, O., & Takegata, R. (2004). Automatic time perception in the human brain for
intervals ranging frommilliseconds to seconds. Psychophysiology, 41, 660–663.
Piazza, M., Facoetti, A., Trussardi, A. N., Berteletti, I., Conte, S., Lucangeli, D., Dehaene, S., & Zorzi, M.
(2010). Developmental trajectory of number acuity reveals a severe impairment in developmental
dyscalculia. Cognition, 116, 33–41.
Poppel, E. (1997). A hierarchical model of temporal perception. Trends Cogn. Sci., 1, 56–61.
Rakitin, B. C., Gibbon, J., Penney, T. B., Malapani, C., Hinton, S. C., & Meck, W. H. (1998). Scalar ex-
pectancy theory and peak-interval timing in humans. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process., 24,
15–33.
Roitman, J. D., Brannon, E. M., Andrews, J. R., & Platt, M. L. (2007). Nonverbal representation of time
and number in adults. Acta Psychol. (Amst.), 124, 296–318.
Rubinsten, O., & Henik, A. (2009). Developmental dyscalculia: Heterogeneity might not mean differ-
ent mechanisms. Trends Cogn. Sci., 13, 92–99.
Rubinsten, O., & Tannock, R. (2010). Mathematics anxiety in children with developmental dyscalcu-
lia. Behav. Brain Funct., 6, 46.
Tokita, M., & Ishiguchi, A. (2011). Temporal information affects the performance of numerosity dis-
crimination: Behavioral evidence for a shared system for numerosity and temporal processing.
Psychon. Bull. Rev., 18, 550–556.
Treisman,M. (1963). Temporal discrimination and the indifference interval. Implications for amodel
of the “internal clock”. Psychol. Monogr., 77, 1–31.
Treisman, M. (1984). Temporal rhythms and cerebral rhythms. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci., 423, 542–565.
Treisman, M., Cook, N., Naish, P. L., & MacCrone, J. K. (1994). The internal clock: Electroencephalo-
graphic evidence for oscillatory processes underlying time perception. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. A, 47,
241–289.
Treisman, M., Faulkner, A., Naish, P. L., & Brogan, D. (1990). The internal clock: Evidence for a tem-
poral oscillator underlying time perception with some estimates of its characteristic frequency.
Perception, 19, 705–743.
Trick, L. M., & Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1993). What enumeration studies can show us about spatial attention:
Evidence for limited capacity preattentive processing. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform., 19,
331–351.
Walsh, V. (2003). A theory ofmagnitude: Commoncorticalmetrics of time, space andquantity.Trends
Cogn. Sci., 7, 483–488.
Watson, A. B., & Pelli, D. G. (1983). QUEST: A Bayesian adaptive psychometric method. Percept. Psy-
chophys., 33, 113–120.
Wearden, J. H. (2005). Origins and development of internal clock theories of psychological time. Psy-
chol. Fr., 50, 5–25.
Wearden, J. H., & McShane, B. (1988). Interval production as an analogue of the peak procedure: Evi-
dence for similarity of human and animal timing processes. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. B, 40, 363–375.
Wechsler, D. (1986).Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Revised. New York, NY, USA: The Psychological
Corporation.
Wiener, M., Turkeltaub, P., & Coslett, H. B. (2010). The image of time: A voxel-wise meta-analysis.
NeuroImage, 49, 1728–1740.
Yates, M. J. (2012). Time and number sense develop in tandem? Front. Integr. Neurosci., 6, 12.
Yates, M. J., Loetscher, T., & Nicholls, M. E. (2012). A generalized magnitude system for space, time,
and quantity? A cautionary note. J. Vis., 12(7), 9.
